All welcome!

Full text of the judgement of the court of the Presbytery of Egoli

Rev Dr Martin (Chunky) Young

REVEREND PROFESSOR JOHANNES WOLMARANS            FIRST RESPONDENT
and
REVEREND DOCTOR MARTIN YOUNG                                  SECOND RESPONDENT
                                                                   
JUDGMENT

Date of hearing:                 10th and 23 November 2015
Nature of proceedings:       Exception in terms of Para 18.97 of the Manual of Faith and  Order 

Court:               R D Twaddle (Convenor) 
                         Rev Armando Sontange
                         Rev Melanie Cook
                         Mrs Sheila Hunt
                         Mr Nathi Ndlovu
                         Mr Nick Caldwell

Appearance:

For Presbytery:         Mr Hylton Cochrane 
For Respondents:     Adv W van der Linde SC 
                                Adv M Kriegler SC 
                                Instructed by Mr H Friedrich 

1. Rev Dr Martin (Chunky) Young and Rev Prof Johannes (Hansie) Wolmarans have  been charged by the Presbytery of eGoli ("Presbytery") with misconduct, arising  from their respectively conducting (solemnizing} and preaching at and blessing  same-sex civil unions.

2. The charges had their genesis in a letter dated 12 December 2014 addressed to the Presbytery of eGoli by Rev Brent Russell on behalf of the Protea Valley Church in the  Western Cape.

3. For purposes of the charges brought against the Respondents by Presbytery, the following extract from Protea Valley's letter is relevant:

"This situation is of grave concern to us and should be for the UPCSA for the 
following reasons:

1. The General Assembly stated quite clearly in 2008 that "In short, then, no  ministers of the UPCSA may perform civil unions at present (whether  heterosexual or homosexual) or apply for a license to do so until such time as  the General Assembly decides that the UPCSA should opt in". Despite this  ruling, Rell Wolmarans proceeded to apply for, receille and use his license  showing disregard for the rulings of General Assembly

2. ......

3 .......

4. Rev Chunky Young is party to this duplicity as he and Rell Wolmarans work  together  in performing civil unions leading us to believe that this is more than  one rogue minister. ReI! Young's involvement should be inllestigated especially  in light of two occasions where he said from the pulpit that he will marry who  he wants irrespective of their sexual orientation. "

4. Presbytery appointed a committee to investigate the allegations by Protea Valley. Following the report of that committee, Presbytery referred the accusations against Dr Young and Prof Wolmarans to this court in terms of Paragraph 18.61 of the Manual of Faith and Order (tithe Manual") and appointed Mr Cochrane as its representative.

5. A notification in terms of Paragraph 18.62 of the Manual was sent to Rev Young and Prof Wolmarans on 30 June 2015. In this notification, the charges of misconduct against Dr Young and Prof Wolmarans were formulated as follows:

              7.1. the act(s) 0/ misconduct that have been alleged against Rev Pro/   Wolmarans are that he materially breaching the covenantal relationship that a Minister has with the Church by conducting same -sex civil unions;

              7.2. the act(s) 0/ misconduct that have been alleged ogainst Rev Dr Young are 
that he materially breached the covenantal relationship that a Minister has 
with the Church by:

                              7.2.1.  preaching at and blessing certain 0/ the same-sex civil unions conducted by                                           Rev Pro /  Wolmarans; and
                              7.2.2.  encouraging Rev Prof Walmarans to conduct same-sex civil unions.

              7.3.         The basis 0/ the charges against you are the /following:

                              7.3.1  The following resolution passed by the 2006 General Assembly, namely:

                                     To confirm the definition of Christian Marriage set out by the Execut                                                     Commission in July 2005:

                                      The Executive Commission affirms:

                              1.1..  Christian marriage is defined within the UPCSA as an ordained covenant that                                       exists between one man  and one  woman under God for life, and holds this                                           definition to be consistent with the authoritative rule of Scripture as well as                                           the one holy Catholic and apostolic church.

                              1.2..  The Executive Commission instructs all Marriage Officers affiliated with the                                        UPCSA to remain faithful  to the Church's  definition of marriage and to                                                exercise pastoral compassion.

                              7.3.2 The premise that in terms of the covenantal relationship that a Minister has                                            with the Church, he/she  promises inter alia to accept  the authority of the                                               Church and to encourage other members to do  the  same.

6. In response to the notification in terms of Paragraph 18.62 of the Manual, the  Respondents raised an exception in terms of Paragraph 18.97, on the ground that it  (the notification in terms of paragraph 18.62) discloses no misconduct.

7. The Respondents' written response to the notification in terms of Paragraph 18.62 of  the Manual states that: " ... some facts are required to be accepted. Those appear  from the body of this document, but they should not be controversial." From a full  reading of the Respondents' written response and the report of Presbytery's  committee, it appears that it is common cause that Prof Wolmarans has conducted  civil unions between same-sex couples and that Dr Young has preached at and  blessed same-sex civil unions. During argument it was disclosed by Mr van der Linde that there were occasions when Prof Wolmarans, at Dr Young's request, simply  solemnized (signed the register), whilst Dr Young conducted the service at which  same-sex civil unions were conducted.

8. Accordingly, at least for purposes of this exception, the facts upon which the charges against Dr Young and Prof Wolmarans are based are not in dispute. In these  proceedings, therefore, it is this court's task to determine whether the conduct  complained of, as set out in the Paragraph 18.62 notification, might constitute  misconduct that materially breaches the covenantal relationship between the UPCSA and the Respondents.

9.  According to the Respondents' written response, the exception is based upon the  following points:

                9.1. That Prof Wolmarans did not act in his capacity as a minister of the UPCSA  when conducting same-sex civil unions,  but as a minister of the New Reformation Church ("NRC"), through which Prof Wolmarans had obtained his license to conduct civil unions;

                9.2. That there are no decisions or resolutions of the General Assembly of the UPCSA that forbid ministers to conduct, preach at or bless same-sex civil unions;

                9.3. That, on the contrary, General Assembly's decisions:

                                 9.3.1.  Condemn discrimination based on sexual orientation as sinful;and

                                 9.3.2.  Exhort ministers of the UPCSA to help same-sex couples, in the same                                                   way that as they would  heterosexual couples, to submit their relationships                                              to God and that the conduct by Prof Wolmarans and  Dr Young that is                                                   complained of  following the letter and the spirit of General Assembly's                                                 position.

10.  Argument was raised in the Respondent's written response as well as at the hearing  of this matter to the effect that, If there were any rule of the Church prohibiting ministers from solemnizing or otherwise acting in an official capacity at same-sex civil union, such prohibition would offend the constitution of South Africa. It was  not indicated what this Court should do with this contention. Indeed, paragraph 77 of the Respondents' written response states that: ". .• this question may not be  necessary or appropriate for this court to determine .... " We agree with this  statement: this Court does not have the jurisdiction to determine whether a rule that has been determined by the General Assembly is a lawful rule. That is the province  of the Court of General Assembly and/or the superior courts of South Africa.

11. I will now deal with the point that, when conducting civil unions, Prof Wolmarans  was not acting in his capacity as a minister of the UPCSA, but as a minister of the NRC.

12. An analogy was drawn during argument based on the fact that Prof Wolmarans is not only a minister of the UPCSA (and, at least according to official record, a minister of the NRC), but that he is also an  academic and professor at the University of  Johannesburg. The argument was that, when Prof   Wolmarans acts in his capacity as a professor at the University of Johannesburg he is NOT acting as a  minister of the UPCSA; similarly, it was argued, when Prof Wolmarans signs a civil union register and   stamps it with the NRC stamp, he acts as a minister of the NRC and not as a minister of the UPCSA.

13. There is clear distinction between the role and function of an academic and the role  and function of a minister. An academic teaches students and probes his/her subject, testing accepted positions, exploring hypotheses and testing boundaries. This is as true of scientific and other academics as it is of theological academics; if that were not so, the church would still condemn anyone who said that the earth was not flat or that the sun did not revolve around the earth.

14. The role and function of ministers in all denominations are similar. Different  denominations may have different structures and procedures, but in all  denominations the role of a minister is to preach the Word to members of the  congregation in which he/she ministers, to administer sacraments and to be a pastor  to the members of his/her congregation.

15. So, for example, it is feasible that something that an academic might say or do in his/her capacity as an academic of a particular educational institution may be completely divorced from his/her role as a minister of a particular denomination and  congregation.

16. However, when a minister acts as a minister in a congregation of the UPCSA, this  court cannot accept that it can be said that the act performed by that minister is not  performed by him/her in his/her capacity as a minister of the UPCSA, but as a minister of another denomination, in this case the NRC, simply because the license issued by the Department of Home Affairs was issued to a minister of the other denomination.

17. There is no suggestion in the Respondents' written response or In the verbal argument that Prof Wolmarans has an active, pastoral role in any congregation of  the NRC. Indeed, from independent research undertaken by members of this Court, it does not seem that the NRC is an active, pastoral denomination.

18. It was disclosed in in argument that at least 5 of the civil unions in question were  conducted at St Columba's and involved members of St Columba's. 

19. It is accepted that in the eyes of the state (the department of Home affairs), the civil  unions conducted by Prof Wolmarans' were conducted by him in his capacity as a  minister of the NRC, simply because his license was issued to a minister of the NRC  and the NRC stamp appears on the certificate.

20. If Prof Wolmarans has conducted civil unions at venues other than St Columba's and where the parties to the civil union have no connection with St Columba's, this Court  is prepared to go so far as to accept that Prof Wolmarans did not conduct those  particular civil unions in his capacity as a minister of the UPCSA, but in his capacity as an independent marriage officer, under his NRC license. However, when Prof  Wolmarans conducts civil unions (or does anything else, for that matter) in St  Columba's sanctuary and members of St Columba's are involved, then, in the eyes of  the UPC5A, in the eyes of the members of 5t Columba's and in the eyes of the world  at large, he can only act in his capacity as a minister of St Columba's and therefore as a minister of the UPCSA.

21. I turn now to the question whether the UPCSA prohibits its members from  conducting, preaching at or blessing same-sex civil unions.

22. During argument, the court enquired from Mr van der Linde whether the question was not simply whether such a prohibition existed. Mr van der Linde averred that the issue was much more complex. It is accepted that this is true in the broader context of the charges against the Respondents. f4owever, for purposes of the  exception that is before the Court, it is this simple - if the UPCSA prohibits ministers from conducting, preaching at or blessing same-sex civil unions, then to do so may  constitute misconduct and the notification in terms of Paragraph 18.62 of the Manual will disclose an offence - whether the Respondents are guilty of the offence  would be determined during the trial on the merits of the charges.

23..The 2006 General Assembly passed the following resolution:
            1. To commit the UPCSA to continued engagement, study and prayer  over this  contentious                   issue (homosexuality), acknowledging  our diversity of opinion, but  relying on the                               promised guidance of God1s spirit. 
            2. To reaffirm that baptism, accompanied by faithl is the sole criterion  for membership of the                 Church. 
            3. To call its members prayerfUlly to consider whether they have failed  to show  christian                        love towards any homosexual  persons in the past  and repent thereof 
            4. To condemn all forms of discrimination and abuse on the basis of sexual orientation as                         such, as sinful. 
            5. To condemn all forms of sexual promiscuity. 
            6. To exercise a prophetic, healing and caring ministry when dealing  with  questionable                           social behaviour. 
            7. To urge all its members to deepen their understanding of the issue  f homosexuality in                          dialogue with homosexual  Christians, through the study of Scripture and with the help of                     insights from medical science and psychology. 
            8. To confirm the definition of Christian marriage set out by the Executive Commission July                    2005 where the Executive  Commission affirmed that:
                              8.1. Christian marriage is defined within the UPCSA as an ordained covenant that                                         exists between one man and  one woman under God for life and holds this                                            definition to'"'be consistent with the authoritative rule  of scripture as well as t                                       he tradition of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.
                              8.2. The Executive Commission instructs all Marriage Officers affiliated with the                                         UPCSA to remain faithful to the Church's definition of  marriage and to                                                 exercise  pastoral compassion and sensitivity in their  dealings with all who                                            approach the  Church for assistance with marriage.
                              8.3  The Executive Commission exhorts all members of the church to uphold the                                           sanctity of Christian marriage  and to acknowledge its role as the proper                                              context for the expression of sexual intimacy between a man  and a woman.

             9. To direct that Presbyteries and congregations, dealing with question of sexuality in relation                  to office bearers of the  Church, should do so in humble prayer for God's guidance In the                     light of the above statement.

24. The resolution of the 2006 General Assembly did not deal with the Civil Unions Bill, for the simple reason that it did not exist at the time preparations were being made for the 2006 General Assembly (the Civil Unions Bill was introduced in 2006,  approved by Cabinet on 24 August 2006 and signed by the Acting State President on 29 November 2006, when it became the Civil Unions Act [no longer a BiIII).             

25. The first time that the UPCSA considered the Civil Unions Act was at the 2008  General Assembly, when the General Assembly considered and debated a report of  the Human Sexuality Committee of General Assembly.

26. The Human Sexuality Committee's report contained a section entitled "Comment  from the Human Sexuality Committee of the UPCSA Subject: Implications of the Civil  Unions Bill (sic) (Act 17 of 2006). This section of the Human Sexuality Committee's report contained the following subsections (the subsection headings are quoted  verbatim): 
              26.1. Current UPCSA position on same sex marriage - This subsection set out the  2006                              General Assembly's position as set out  in the resolution quoted in 20 above and                                     expressed the view that the resolution precludes homosexual marriages by  implication,                       and instructs UPCSA marriage officers to conduct marriages only within the parameters                       of the definition  of marriage, as affirmed by the 2008 General Assembly resolution.                             This section makes the point that there is an  ambiguity between the denomination's                             statement on marriage and its statement on homosexuality, but concludes that the                                 ambiguity creates a healthy tension, as it highlights the need between continuing                                    dialogue between members of the UPCSA with opposing viewpoints on the matter.

              26.2. Current practice allowable by the Civil Unions Bill (sic) - This subsection states  the                            factual position in connection  with marriages and civil unions. It is  quoted verbatim: 

                    Within South Africa, couples wishing to enter into a permanent union may  decide to be                       married under the Marriage Act  25 of 1961 (applicable only. to  heterosexual couples                         only), or enter a civil union under the new Civil Unions  Act 17 of 2006 (this is                                     applicable to both heterosexual and homosexual  couples, whose union may be registered                     as a civil   partnership or as a marriage). This means that since civil unions are regulated                     by a separate bill,  hence clergy who   are marriage officers under the Marriage Act 25 of                     1961 do  not automatically have the right to perform a civil union.    Such authority is                           granted by the Department of Home Affairs, but only to denominational  groupings and                       not to  individuals. Thus it is required that the entire  denomination 'opt in' before any                           individuals from it can be licensed   to  perform civil unions (and then only once they                           have been tested for proficiency  in their knowledge of the Act).  Should a denomination                     'opt in', this doesn't  however oblige all their ministers to perform civil unions, because                          the  Act retains the right of individuals to refuse to do so on the grounds of conscience                         religion or belief.

                     In short, then, no ministers 0/ the UPCSA may per/orm civil unions at present  (whether                       heterosexual or homosexual) or  apply for a license to do so until  such time as the                               General Assembly decides that the UPCSA should 'opt in'.  There  are a number of                               ministers who have already expressed a desire to  petition the General Assembly in this                       regard, and it  is suggested that others  who are interested in being part of this contact                           the Committee, whose task it  is to  interpret the mind of the UPCSA in this regard and                        facilitate appropriate  proposals if necessary.

              26.3. How then might we relate to same-sex couples within UPCSA congregations? -_This                          subsection repeats the position that if anyone requests a minister to conduct a same-sex                        marriage or civil union, ministers are unable to accede to  such   requests. It goes on to                        state that 'to shrug such a request off with a  "rule determined" refusal would be a grave                       error' and goes on to make suggestions as to how ministers might deal with same sex                           couples. These suggestions affirm  the denomination's acceptance of homosexuals as                           Christians and as members of the denomination and emphasizes that   ministers should                         follow their own consciences and choose how to respond to homosexual couples. 

27. The 2008 General Assembly made the following decision in connection with the Human Sexuality Committee's report (see "DECISIONS OF THE 8TH GENERAL ASSEMBLY AFFECTING MINISTERS" at page 497 of Papers for the Executive Commission and General Assembly 2008): 

                    2. Assembly receives the committee's 'Comment on the Implications of the Civil  Unions                         Btlt' (sic) and sends it to  UPCSA ministers and Sessions/church councils for study                               and comment to the convener.

                   3. The Assembly reminds all ministers and congregations of its statement and resolutions                         of 20061 and reminds them of  the availability of the discussion document prepared by                        this committee.

28. The first decision, preceding those quoted in 12, was: "Assembly receives the report."

29. There was some debate in the written arguments as to the effect of the decision  "Assembly receives the report. n In paragraphs 28, 29 and 30 of their response to the  Paragraph 18.62 notification, the Respondents averred that the Human Sexuality Committee's report to the 2008 General Assembly was binding on ministers. In answer, Presbytery expressed the view that this was incorrect and that "Assembly  receives the report. H simply means what it says, that Assembly has received the report, and confers no authority on any of the content of the report. In reply, the respondents contended that that this would be untenable and that when assembly receives a report, that report becomes a resolution of General Assembly. The  Respondents took the somewhat unusual step of annexing an em ail from the Rev Alan Maker, a past moderator of General Assembly (and a past minster of St Columba's and colleague of Dr Young) to support their contention.

30. Both Presbytery and the Respondents are correct. If a report is submitted to General Assembly and that report contains specific proposals and General Assembly receives  the report and says nothing further about it, then General Assembly must have  adopted the proposals made in the report. If General Assembly receives a report  and, following debate, makes resolutions relating to specific parts of the report, then those specific parts of the report are not adopted by General Assembly, but the  subsequent resolutions are. It must follow that those parts of the report that are not  dealt with in the resolutions that have followed debate are then adopted by General  Assembly.

31 In the letter that Protea Valley sent to the Presbytery of eGoli, Rev Brent Russell states the following as the basis for Protea Valley's complaint against the Respondents: The General Assembly stated quite clearly in 2008 that,  "In short, then, no ministers of the UPCSA may perform civil unions at present (whether heterosexual or homosexual) or apply for a license to do so until such time as the General Assembly decides that the UPCSA should" opt in". Rev Russell clearly interprets this as an instruction by General Assembly to Ministers that they may not  perform civil unions or apply for a license to do so.

32. Because, presumably, of Presbytery's stance on the effect of receiving a report, the charges against the respondents are not based on the same premise as that upon which Rev Russell's complaint is based, but rather on the premise that paragraph 8 of the resolution of the 2006 General Assembly (quoted in 23 above) implies that ministers ofthe UPCSA are prohibited from conducting same sex civil unions.

33. Although the basis for Protea Valley's complaint is not the basis of Presbytery's  charges against Dr Young and Prof Wolmarans, I wish to deal with it at this juncture.

34. The proposals that accompanied the Human Sexuality Committee's report to the 2008 General Assembly were the following:

             1. Assembly receives the report;

             2. Assembly endorses the committee's 'Comment on the Implications of the Civil Unions Bill' and commends it to UPCSA  ministers and SeSSions/Church Councils; 

             3. The Assembly reminds al/ ministers and congregations of its statement and  resolutions of 2006 ~ and reminds them of the availability of the discussion  document prepared by this committee.

35. If the 2008 General Assembly had adopted the committee's proposals without amendment, Rev Russell would have been correct.

36. However, only proposals 1 and 2 were adopted without amendment, as mentioned  in 27 above. Proposal 2 was not adopted. Instead, General Assembly resolved to  receive "the committee's 'Comment on the Implications of the Civil Unions Bill' (sic)  and sends it to UPCSA ministers and Sessions/church councils for study and comment  to the convener. Even if this court were to find that tRe Human Sexuality Committee  was proposing that the statement "In short, then, no ministers of the UPCSA may perform civil unions at present (whether heterosexual or homosexual) or apply for a license to do so until such time as the General Assembly decides that the UPCSA should opt in" should be an instruction to Ministers, this formed part of the committee's report that was not adopted by General Assembly, but that was instead  sent to ministers and Sessions/Church Council's for comment.

37. That part of the Human Sexuality Committee's report that comprised the committee's 'Comment on the Implications of the Civil Unions Bill' (sic) was not unqualifiedly received by General Assembly and the committee's proposal in connection with it was not adopted. Instead, that part of the report was sent down  to ministers and Sessions/Church Councils. It must therefore follow that nothing  that was contained in that part of the Human Sexuality Committee's report that comprised the committee's 'Comment on the Implications of the Civil Unions Bill'  (sic) was adopted by General Assembly and that, consequently, nothing that was  contained in that part of the report constitutes a decision of or a direction by  General Assembly.

38. It was also argued by Mr van der Unde that the commit tee's statement "In short,  then, no ministers of the UPCSA may perform civil unions at present (whether heterosexual or homosexual) or apply for a license to do so until such time as the General Assembly decides that the UPCSA should opt in" was, in any event, not  proposed as an instruction to ministers, but that it was merely a statement of the  factual position. I respectfully agree with this argument:

                38.1. The paragraph heading under which this statement falls is Current practice  allowable                           by the Civil Unions Bill(sic).  If the committee wished to propose  the creation of a                              rule, it would have said so, or at the very least placed the  statement in question                                     under the next paragraph heading, namely: How then  might we relate to same-sex                              couples within   UPCSA  congregations?

                38.2. The text in question states that 'no ministers at the UPCSA may perform civil  unions                           at present (whether   heterosexual or homosexual).' A civil union between                                             heterosexual people is available to them as an alternative to a   marriage under the                                 Marriage Act. It seems that, from a spiritual perspective, the Human Sexuality                                     Committee and the UPCSA do not differentiate between  a marriage and a civil                                    union, as secular law does; it is clear that the UPCSA    regards a civil union as a                                   marriage. If, therefore, the committee wished to  propose the creation of a rule, it                                would not have included heterosexual  couples in the prohibition.

39. This Court is therefore satisfied that the Human Sexuality Committee did not  propose a rule that no ministers of the UPCSA may perform civil unions at present  (whether heterosexual or homosexual) or apply for a license to do so until such time  as the General Assembly decides that the UPCSA should opt in, but was simply stating the factual position. In the event, though, it does not matter, as this is  contained in that part of the report that was neither endorsed nor adopted by  General Assembly, but sent down for comment, as outlined at some length above.

40.The UPCSA has not expressly forbidden its ministers from conducting same-sex civil  unions. As previously mentioned, the charges against Dr Young and Prof Wolmarans  are based on the premise that paragraph 8 of the resolution of the 2006 General Assembly quoted in 20 above implies that ministers of the UPCSA are prohibited  from conducting same sex civil unions.

41.An implied prohibition (or instruction) cannot lightly be inferred. After considering  all relevant facts and circumstances, it must be the only logical conclusion to be  drawn.

42 It is opportune to quote the paragraph from which Presbytery seeks this Court to find that there is an implied prohibition upon UPCSA ministers from conducting  same-sex civil unions:

                                8.   To confirm the definition of Christian marriage set out by the Executive                                                 Commission  in July 2005  where the Executive Commission affirmed that:

                                8.1. Christian marriage is defined within the UPCSA as an ordained covenant that                                        exists between one man   and one woman under God for life and holds this                                            definition to be consistent with the authoritative  rule of scripture as well as                                           the tradition of the one Holy Catholic and Apostolic Church.

                                8.2  The Executive Commission instructs all Marriage Officers affiliated  with the                                        UPCSA to remain    faithful to the Church's definition of marriage and to                                              exercise pastoral compassion and sensitivity  in their dealings with all who                                            approach the Church for assistance with marriage.

                              8.3    The Executive Commission exhorts all members of the church to uphold the                                          sanctity of Christian  marriage and to acknowledge its ro Context for the                                                expression of sexual intimacy   between a man and a woman.

43. It is a known fact that some (I venture to say many, if not all) ministers of the UPCSA conduct marriage services for divorcees. It is also a known fact that, during the  course of marriage counselling and when it is clear that the parties to the troubled marriage cannot reconcile, some (again, many, if not all) UPCSA ministers will advise  those whom they are counselling to seek a divorce. Ministers who do this are not  accused of misconduct; it therefore follows that the UPCSA considers marrying  divorcees and advising members to divorce when there is no prospect of restoring a relationship to be acceptable practice when measured against the definition of 
Christian Marriage within the UPCSA.

44. But, on an extremely strict interpretation of the Executive Commission's instruction as quoted above, these events must offend the Church's definition of marriage. It  must therefore follow that 8.2 of the 2006 General Assembly's resolution cannot be  interpreted so as to imply that UPCSA ministers are prohibited from doing anything  in connection with a marriage that is not entirely consistent with the idea of an ordained covenant that exists between one man and one woman under God for life. If this conclusion were wrong, then every minister who has married a divorcee or who has advised someone whom they were counselling to seek a divorce must be guilty of misconduct.

45. Other factors that must be taken into account when weighing up whether the Executive commission's instruction contains an implied prohibition against ministers  conducting civil unions are the UPCSA's position on homosexuality as stated in the 2006 General Assembly resolution and that part of the 2008 Human Sexuality Committee Report that was received without qualification. It is clear from these that  ministers were given the space, according to their individual consciences, to preach  the Gospel in such a way as that people are enabled to engage in creative dialogue about same-sex relationships and the need for health and commitment in such  relationships and to minister to same-sex couples and to help them to submit their relationship to God.

46. Taking all of these factors into account, it cannot be found that the only logical  conclusion to be drawn from paragraph 8 of the 2006 General Assembly resolution is that ministers are forbidden from conducting, preaching at or blessing same-sex civil unions. Accordingly, this court cannot infer an implied prohibition upon ministers conducting, preaching at or blessing same sex civil unions. On the contrary, blessing same sex civil unions at the very least would be in line with the pastoral, supportive and accepting approach advocated by the 2006 resolution.

47. In the absence of an express or implied prohibition against ministers conducting  same-sex civil unions, Prof Wolmarans' conducting of same-sex civil unions and Dr Young's preaching at and/or blessing same-sex civil unions or encouraging Prof  Wolmarans to conduct same-sex civil unions cannot constitute misconduct.

48. In the result, the exception is upheld and the charges against Dr Young and Prof Wolmarans are dismissed.

(JOHANNESBURG ON 10 December 2015).

The following is recorded at the request of the dissenting members of the Court:

This judgment was written by Mr R 0 Twaddle

Rev M Cook Mrs S Hunt concur with Mr Twaddle's Judgment

Rev A Sontange, Mr N Ndlovu and Mr N caldwell dissent from paragraphs 41 to 48 of Mr Twaddle's judgment. Their view is that:

· the resolution of the 2006 General Assembly does create an implied rule that ministers of the UPCSA are prohibited from conducting civil unions; and

· consequently, the exception should be dismissed insofar as it relates to the acts of conducting civil unions on the part of Prof Wolmarans and encouraging Prof Wolmarans to conduct civil unions on the part of Dr Young.

The Convenor of this Court has a casting vote in addition to his deliberative vote. 
The Convenor exercised his casting vote in favour of adopting the entire judgment 
contained in paragraphs 1 to 48 as the judgment of this court.

TO: 

AND TO:

AND TO:

Respondents' attorneys 

Friedrich Incorporated 

The Representative of the Presbytery of eGoli  
Mr H W Cochrane 

The Clerk of the Presbytery of eGoli 
Mr Nathi Ndlovu

Death With Dignity: The Ethics of Resisting and Accepting Death

St. Columba’s Church, Johannesburg, SA (10-20-15)

Nancy J. Duff

 

Rev. Dr. Chunky Young with Rev. Dr. David Mertz and his wife Rev. Prof. Nancy Duff.

In one chapter of his best selling book, Being Mortal, the physician, Atul Gawande describes how difficult it can be for patients with life-threatening illnesses and their families to determine when to say, “No more. No more treatment.” We imagine,” Gawande says, “that we can wait until the doctors tell us that there is nothing more they can do. But rarely is there nothing more that doctors can do.”  There are always more drugs, more operations, more radiation treatments, and then, of course,  a feeding tube, and a respirator to extend life, or perhaps to extend dying.

Without clear indication from a physician that life saving treatment has become futile, patients and their families feel caught between fear that further treatment will do more harm than good and hope, however thin, that the next round of treatment will produce the miracle they’re hoping for. They rarely get clear indication from doctors that further treatment cannot stave off death for long, or in any meaningful way.

But it’s interesting that most physicians say they won’t choose medical intervention when they’re close to death. “A Stanford University study  shows almost 90 percent of doctors in the US would forgo resuscitation and aggressive treatment if facing a terminal illness.”  Referring to Dylan Thomas’s poem, one professor of medicine said of his own end of life care: "There will be no heroics, and I will go gentle into that good night."  But those same doctors aren’t often able to advise patients to do the same.

There has, however, been something of a shift in this scenario in the United States. While it’s still true that patients wait for doctors to give permission to stop treatment, while doctors want to do more, there is an increasing number of cases where doctors are ready to stop life-extending treatment, while patients, or more often their families, insist that everything be done. They choose to “rage against the dying of the light” against all odds and sometimes against all reason.

In the hospital where I’m on the ethics committee, we had a case where a patient’s body was deteriorating to the point that the odor of death filled his room, and yet the patient’s wife insisted that medical treatment continue – until he died. Whether it’s doctors or patients demanding continued treatment, or saying “Enough!,” knowing when to resist death and when to accept death is a moral and existential dilemma that isn’t easily resolved.

In the United States, the public and legal debate over the ethics of resisting and accepting death started with cases that involved requests to withdraw life support from patients in a permanent vegetative state: 

•       In 1976 the New Jersey State Supreme Court allowed the respirator to be removed from 21 year-old Karen Quinlan, who was in a permanent vegetative state. Her parents, who were faith Roman Catholics accompanied by their priest, didn’t want the feeding tube removed, and probably wouldn’t have been given permission to remove it anyway. 

•       Seven years later, in 1983 the US Supreme Court cleared the way for the feeding tube to be removed from 25 year-old Nancy Cruzan who was in a permanent vegetative state.

•       These two cases resulted in legal decisions that emphasized patient autonomy, living wills, and the right to die. But they did not put the controversy to rest.

•       In 2005, Terry Schiavo’s husband’s request to remove her feeding tube was granted for the third and last time. Public officials who spoke against the action included then governor of Florida, Jeb Bush, and the President of the United States, George W. Bush. 

•       And as recently as 2014, the body of 33 year-old Marlise Muñoz was kept on what would usually be called “life support,” but we can’t use that term because she had been declared dead at John Peter Smith Hospital in Fort Worth, Texas. She was kept on those machines against the family’s wishes because she was pregnant. The hospital finally admitted that the baby, who had been deprived of oxygen for over an hour, wasn’t viable.

If in the US, there’s no agreement on withdrawing life support from a person in a permanent vegetative state, or taking the body of a person already pronounced dead off machines, you can imagine there is fierce debate over the issue of assisted death.

That debate escalated last year when 29 year-old Brittany Maynard made public her decision to end her life after being diagnosed with brain cancer and given only six months to live. She moved from California, where assisted death was then illegal, to Oregon in time to establish residency and take advantage of Oregon’s death with dignity law. Had the brain cancer been allowed to take its course, permanent sedation would eventually have been required to control her pain – and that was something she didn’t want. She ended her life on November 1, 2014.

The legal situation in the US is somewhat complex. Because the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in 1997 that there is no constitutionally protected right (it wasn’t declared unconstitutional), the decision is left to each state to decide whether to adopt a death with dignity law. Five states in the US allow assisted death.

·        Oregon (the first, 1997)

·        Washington State (2009).

·        Vermont (2013 – by act of Vermont legislature rather than popular vote)

·        As of two weeks ago, California

·        Montana decriminalized assisted death in 1998, but doesn’t have a death with dignity law.

Death with dignity laws allow physicians to prescribe lethal doses of medication to terminally ill patients, but there are restrictions.

·        Physicians write the prescription, but are not allowed to administer the medication directly. No one is. (A few physicians choose to be present at the time the pt takes the lethal dose of drugs, but are not required to do so.)

·        The patient who receives such a prescription must have a prognosis (confirmed by two doctors) of six months or less to live.

·        The patient has to be competent. Doctors have the right to require a psychological evaluation, although they rarely do.

·        Each patient must be informed of other options, including palliative and hospice care.

·        Any patient may change his or her mind at any time. In fact, some patients fill the prescription, take it home, and never use it.

Outside those five states it is a felony to assist someone in suicide. Many people who support death with dignity laws, use the term “assisted death” rather than “assisted suicide,” because people with a terminal illness (unlike people who seek to take their lives because of despair or mental illness) want to live, but living is no longer an option: they know they are going to die. Assisted death gives them one of the few choices they have left to control the situation: to choose when and how they will die instead of allowing the disease to make that choice for them, all the while robbing them of all the pleasures of daily life.

Three groups in the US have provided the most vocal opposition to assisted death: (A) the Catholic Church and conservative evangelical Christians, (B) disability-rights organizations, and (C) physicians. For the rest of our time together, I’m going to describe some of the arguments that each of these three groups present and respond to them.

A. CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE: AGAINST

1. Divine Sovereignty. Christians who are against assisted death often base their argument on divine sovereignty, claiming that because our lives belong to God, we shouldn’t thwart God’s purposes by ending life even in light of impending death. We need to put all our efforts into tending to the needs of a dying person: pain management, being present, and making that person comfortable – but we cannot help that person take his or her life. We cannot play God.

2. Autonomy. Some Christians argue that emphasizing individual autonomy to give a person the right to end life destroys the bonds among people that the Christian community values. As part of the body of Christ, we don’t make independent and autonomous decisions, and we should be able to rely on the people around us as we suffer with terminal illness and pain. In turn, members of the community are called to care for the sick and dying as they suffer – not help them end their lives.

3. Suffering. These Christians sometimes argue that while suffering should be alleviated to the extent possible by medical intervention, pain also needs to be endured in faith. When Brittany Maynard made her plans to take her life public, Kara Tippetts, a 36 year-old mother of 4 young children who was dying of breast cancer, wrote a letter to Brittany Maynard on a blog. In her message, she spoke of Christian faith, suffering, and death:

Brittany, … You have been told a lie. A horrible lie, that your dying will not be beautiful. That the suffering will be too great. … Yes, your dying will be hard, but it will not be without beauty. 

Hastening death was never what God intended. But in our dying, He does meet us with His beautiful grace. Conservative evangelical Christians like Kara Tippetts don’t intend to glorify suffering, but to sanctify it, believing we can glorify God even in our suffering.

The Roman Catholic Church, which has long allowed the withdrawal of life support in certain circumstances, has also stood strongly against physician assisted death, articulating some of the same arguments as conservative evangelicals and believing that if a dying patient is properly cared for, that person will not request assistance in hastening death.

A.           CHRISTIAN PERSPECTIVE: IN FAVOR

•       Divine Sovereignty. I agree that in life and in death our lives belong to God. But I don’t think the charge of “playing God” is useful. We could just as easily argue that we are playing God by not letting someone die and by making every effort to keep a person alive, even when medical intervention does nothing but extend dying. Aren’t we assuming god-like control by insisting that a terminally ill patient face all the suffering, limitations, pain, and indignities that the disease hands out when medical intervention can’t control it? I think we should leave the phrase “playing God” behind and ask instead how to serve God’s purposes for the specific suffering human being who stands before us.

•       Autonomy. I agree that autonomy is not exactly a Christian virtue. Christians understand themselves as individuals who are part of the body of Christ. What we do – the decisions we make – aren’t about us alone:The eye cannot say to the hand, ‘I have no need of you,’ nor again the head to the feet, ‘I have no need of you.’  On the contrary, the members of the body that seem to be weaker are indispensable,” says Paul in I Corinthians. (I Cor. 12:21-22)

But choosing assisted death doesn’t preclude conversations with other people or considerations of how such an act will affect others. All through his book Final Exit, which instructs terminally ill people on how to take their lives, Derek Humphries encourages people with terminal illness to talk to their family and friends before making such a serious decision.

But even if we don’t embrace autonomy, the Christian faith doesn’t say that some people have the authority to make decisions for everyone else. Kara Tippetts, the woman with breast cancer who posted the letter to Brittany Maynard, died March 22, 2015. She was a good example of someone who didn’t emphasize autonomy, relying on other Christians to help her carry the burdens that cancer had forced upon her.  I admire the way she chose to face death. I don’t, however understand why she thought her choice should be imposed on everyone else, or why she thought God’s grace doesn’t meet someone when death is hastened by drugs. And I disagree with her claim that suffering is beautiful.

 Jessica Kelly, another evangelical Christian, posted a response to Tara Tippets, insisting that suffering at the end of life isn’t always beautiful. Having lost her young son to brain cancer she wrote:

Trust me, Brittany has been told the truth.  My son’s death was not beautiful.  His suffering was great. … At first we were able to manage his pain with modern medication, but as the tumor grew, the pain would find a way to exceed the medication’s capabilities. He would often wake with a scream, gripping his head as the pressure increased from the fluids trapped within his skull.

She concluded by saying: “There is no place in the Bible that says death is beautiful. It stands among the powers and principalities and is the last enemy to be defeated by Christ.” 

Here, this mother has touched on what I believe is the foundation for a Christian ethic of resisting and accepting death: there are two views of death in the Bible.  On the one hand, the Bible says death stands among the powers and principalities. It is the enemy to be fought against. (I Cor. 15:26) Death cannot be viewed simply as a transition from one stage of life to another and certainly is not to be understood as beautiful. On the other hand, the Bible says death is part of created life. We are created human and not divine, so we live within the limits of birth and death.

Acknowledging that death is part of what it means to be human is not the same as a certain “death is natural movement.” There are situations where death comes as a friend, but Christians shouldn’t be seduced into believing that death is simply the final stage of growth – an odd claim since death actually means that all possibility of growth in this life is gone. Even saying that death is a natural part of life is odd, because in reality it isn’t part of life, but the end of life.

The homilitician, Tom Long, offers one of the worst instances of the death is natural movement that he found in one denomination’s study document [The] death of an older person should be a beautiful event. There is beauty in birth, growth, fullness of life and then, equally so, in the tapering off and final end. There are analogies all about us. What is more beautiful than the spring budding of small leaves, then the fully-leaved tree in summer; and then in the beautiful brightly colored autumn leaves gliding gracefully to the ground? So it is with humans. 

I don’t know what the study means by “older person,” but I can tell you that at 64, I find those reflections insulting. And when my 90 year-old mother passed away last year, even knowing that she was very sick and ready to die, I could never compare her death to a leaf gliding from a tree in the fall.

We are created mortal human beings and not gods. Our life is bounded by the limits of birth and death, and we have to face our mortality. But Scripture also tells us that death stands among the powers and principalities. I’m suggesting we need to hold those two things in tension.

My question regarding assisted death as a Christian is: When Death as the enemy brings intolerable suffering that dying, left to its own time-table, will not soon resolve and medical intervention cannot alleviate, why is choosing to hasten one’s death thought to fall outside the will of God?

B. DISABILITY RIGHTS: AGAINST

The primary argument against assisted death by disability rights organizations is based on the slippery slope. If we allow individuals with a terminal illness to take their own lives, so their claim goes, we will eventually find ourselves in a situation where people with disabilities and the elderly will either be pressured to take their own lives or eventually have their lives taken from them against their will.  According to disability rights organizations, if we allow people with terminal illness to take their own lives, we will inevitably slide into involuntary euthanasia. 

B. DISABILITY RIGHTS:  IN FAVOR

The slippery slope argument is often dismissed by supporters of assisted death as a philosophical fallacy, but I don’t think we can entirely ignore it. Intellectual honesty requires us to consider whether it’s possible for our position to carry us to a more extreme stance than we want to embrace. For instance, we know that some vulnerable members of society such as elderly patients in nursing facilities are already abused. Their care can be burdensome and costly. Might someone coerce them into choosing death or even directly administer the drugs against their will?

I think it’s careless not to invoke the slippery slope. But the fallacy of the slippery slope argument occurs when one assumes the slide into a more radical action is inevitable. Just because abuse can occur doesn’t mean it will occur. We need to put better systems in place to protect the elderly and people with disabilities right now and certainly we need to keep them safe if assisted death is made legal.

People with disabilities have every reason to fight for the right to live free from all forms of discrimination. And they have every good reason to expect us to fight with them. But they don’t have the right to insist that other people suffer because they think others should endure suffering rather than choose death.

And, in fact, some people with disabilities are angry because they can’t take advantage of death with dignity even when it’s legal. For instance, by the time people with ALS (amyotrophic lateral sclerosis) are six months from dying, they can no longer hold the glass of lethal drugs without assistance. Disability rights organizations aren’t protecting all disabled people from discrimination. They are actually increasing the suffering of some.

It’s true that the church cannot say it believes a person’s life has ceased to have value or has become useless and no longer productive. No matter what the situation, no matter how bad the pain or distorted the body, a dying person’s life does matter. But we also have to recognize that some people who are dying reach a point where life has ceased to have value for them – no matter what we think.

One terminally ill person suggested that we each have a list of those things – that if lost – would mean life was no longer worth living. 

A woman on the ethics committee told us that her dad said before surgery: “If I can still watch football and drink beer, then I want to live.” (What’s odd is that she said as far as she knew, her father had never watched football in his life.) Others say if they loose the capacity to work in the garden, or interact with their children or grandchildren, or enjoy a meal, life will lose its value for them. Assisted death refers to voluntary requests made by people who want to control when they die. We can make assisted death legal and put controls in place, so that is doesn’t lead to the death of people who want to live.

C. DOCTORS: OPPOSED

Many individual doctors and all but one physicians’ organizations in the U.S. say that for a doctor to prescribe a lethal dose of medication goes against everything medicine is meant to do.  Arguments against assisted death in the world of medicine usually make two points:  (1) Medicine is for cure and care, not killing and (2) there are alternatives to assisted death: hospice and palliative care. With proper care, they argue, terminally ill patients don’t need the alternative of assisted death. We have the tools at hand to take care of them.

C. DOCTORS: IN FAVOR

Only one professional organization for physicians, The California Medical Association, has changed its long-held position against assisted death. And there are individual doctors who support assisted death. Timothy Quill is the best known.  He published an essay in the New England Journal of Medicine in 1991, titled “Diane,” giving an account of how and why he prescribed barbiturates for a 45-year-old woman with a severe form of leukemia who didn’t want to continue treatment. She had been his patient for many years, and he disagreed with her decision. But after extensive conversations with her and her family, he knew she was “mentally alert and making her decision calmly, fully aware of all the alternatives.”

Medicine isn’t just about cure; it is always about care. But care means listening to the patient, to what he or she fears the most, and how that patient wants to face death. Alleviating suffering has to be among the primary goals of medicine. And it simply isn’t true that we always have the tools to manage suffering.

•       The woman whose child was dying said, “The pain always found a way to leak through.”

•       In a documentary called “How to Die in Oregon,” a man’s brain tumor began to press upon his eyes until he couldn’t close his eyelids. No medical intervention could address his pain.

And pain isn’t actually the primary reason people have taken advantage of death with dignity laws: loss of autonomy, decreasing ability to participate in activities that made life enjoyable, and loss of dignity are often cited as reasons people want to take advantage of a death with dignity law.

One of the benefits of the debate over assisted death is that more people have become aware of hospice and palliative care. Also, people don’t typically take their lives immediately upon receiving the prescription for a lethal dose of drugs, and some never use the lethal dose at all. It is an action of last resort in case things become unbearable. There is evidence that the freedom of knowing they have a choice enables patients to enjoy the life they have left. And it allows them to avoid the worst forms of suffering their illness is going to dole out if left unchecked.

CONCLUSION: ETHICS

As we consider the ethics of resisting and accepting death, I think Christians should move away from absolute principles, such as “Thou shalt not kill” and think contextually. As a Christian ethicist I don’t believe divine commands are absolute. We don’t keep or obey the commandments. We obey the living God who gives them. Divine commandments aren’t abstract principles we adhere to no matter what the situation. And the summary of the commandment is to love God, neighbor, and self. We don’t serve God or neighbor by following the letter of the law.

Also, the commandment against killing – as with all the commandments – has a positive message – to preserve and protect life. I don’t believe that protecting life means we keep people alive for as long as possible, no matter what their pain or suffering or how meaningless life has become for them. Protecting life can’t mean we keep bodies animated. No Christian understanding of what it mean

 to be human reduces our humanity to an animated body, such as in permanent sedation at the end of life.

It may sound like double speak to say that protecting life leads us to support assisted death, but I believe it does. We are protecting the integrity of the life of someone with a debilitating, life-threatening, and sometimes painful disease by giving them control over when and how they die, so they can face death on their own terms and not let Death control the final weeks and hours of life. We should call into question any approach to ethics that tries to apply “clear formulaic principles” if those principles cannot take into account the suffering of patients. Such principles arise from a theoretical construct and aren’t appropriate for the “daily living of human life” as my teacher and mentor, Paul Lehmann, used to say. 

We should certainly resist death as long as living is still a genuine possibility, but we shouldn’t prolong the agony of dying. We can accept death and even support the hastening of death when such an action is freely chosen by someone who wants to control the final days of life. And we do so, knowing with certainty that in life and in death we belong to God.

Sabbath: God’s First and Last Word

Exodus 20: 8-11; Romans 8:35-39
Nancy J. Duff
St. Columba’s Presbyterian Church, Johannesburg, SA
Sunday Evening, October 18, 2015

Rev. Prof. Nancy Duff and her husband Rev. Dr. David Mertz

Writing about the Sabbath, the Jewish scholar, Abraham Heschel, said:
The Sabbath is endowed with a felicity that enraptures the soul, that glides into our thoughts with a healing sympathy. It is a day on which hours do not oust one another. It is a day that can soothe all sadness away.

They are beautiful words, but I have to admit they don’t ring true for me. I have memories as a child of visiting my grandparents in rural East Texas where Sunday required sitting through long worship services with long-winded preachers. As kids, we spent Sunday afternoons desperately seeking ways to occupy ourselves as the adults took naps, resting from the usual bustle of farm life. It may have been great for them, but to us children it was dull and tedious.

To make matters worse, so-called blue laws at the time required virtually everything to be closed. Movie theatres were closed on Sunday, and the few retail stores that were open had to post a list of items that could not be purchased on Sunday. And, of course, anything of interest to me was on that list. For me, Sunday was a tedious day of too much time on my hands and nothing to do.
That stands in stark contrast to how things are in the U.S. today. Except for privately owned stores, most retail stores are open on Sundays. Malls are crowded with shoppers. Restaurants are open to diners. And sports events are scheduled throughout the day, forcing some parents to choose between letting their children go to practice or insisting they go to church. And I have to admit, I often use Sunday afternoons to catch up with work for the week ahead. As Walter Brueggemann says about the U.S., “we are a society of 24/7 multitasking in order to achieve, accomplish, perform, and possess.”

Sabbath is “endowed with a felicity that enraptures the soul”?  When Sabbath becomes a tedious day with nothing to do or just another day to work, the rhythm of life intended for us by the Sabbath commandment has been destroyed. It is destroyed, on the one hand, by the emptiness of endless and unwanted rest and, on the other, by the emptiness of “unending labor” and activity.

But when rightly understood, the Sabbath commandment provides us with a circadian rhythm of sorts. According to biologists, every cell in our body works according to the rising and setting of the sun in 24-hour cycles. We know that caffeine or computer screens or crossing too many time zones can interrupt that rhythm, as can being required or being compelled to work all the time or being required to do nothing at all.

The Old Testament scholar, Pat Miller, says the Sabbath commandment is about what the community does with time.  The commandment provides the bookends of the time God has given us.
• On the one hand, the Christian tradition has sometimes, like Judaism, understood Sabbath to be the last day of the week – “the day toward which all other days move”: the day of rest and peace.

• On the other hand, Christian tradition has also understood the Sabbath to be the first day of the week –the day of resurrection and of hope for new beginnings.

Sabbath gives us the bookends of life itself where God has the last word when work is over and when God has the first word as life is renewed.

Those bookends are reflected in the two reasons the Bible gives us for observing the Sabbath:
• The book of Exodus tells us to keep the Sabbath because God rested on the seventh day. Sabbath has to do with the circadian rhythm of creation and our need to rest.

• The book of Deuteronomy tells us to observe the Sabbath because God freed the Israelites from slavery. Sabbath has to do with freedom from bondage.

Here we begin to understand Heschel’s beautiful words about the Sabbath – how it is endowed with a felicity that enraptures the soul: Sabbath brings peace born of rest and hope born of freedom and then infuses that peace and hope into our weekly lives and even into the seasons of our lives. But some people have entered a season of life that isn’t infused with the peace and hope offered by the Sabbath. Some people have entered a season of nothing to do while others have entered a season of endless work.
On the one hand, some people have entered a time of life that is emptied of anything meaningful to do. This may be especially true of the elderly who have entered the world of institutionalized care, where medicine has learned to take care of the body while killing the soul, where days are scheduled around medication, meals offered when others think it’s time for you to eat, and genuine encounter with human beings is often replaced by endless hours of TV. The blessing of Sabbath rest and Sabbath hope has been destroyed.
On the other hand, some people– by choice, necessity, or compulsion – have entered a time of:
• endless work that still doesn’t bring in enough income;
• or endless responsibilities that time cannot possibly accommodate;
• or endless attempts to fill the time with meaning through constant activity.

In both cases the Sabbath rhythm of rest and peace, of freedom and hope are destroyed.
Because we are commanded to keep the Sabbath holy, I believe the church is called to redeem the time for it’s own members and for those who live around us. We don’t have to force our practices and beliefs on others (as Sunday closing laws did) to help redeem the time for those with too much rest imposed on them and for those for whom “unrelenting labor” produces its own kind of emptiness.
There is, for instance, an Alzheimer’s village in Amsterdam where people with dementia are not locked in their rooms with strangers for roommates. They eat according to their own schedules and freely walk about the village that has a time square, a movie theater, and a garden. Caretakers are dressed in regular clothes watching over residents’ activities while cameras monitor their movements. There is only way in and out of the village, so everyone is safe.   It is an alternative form of care that refuses to allow people’s lives to fall into a season of meaningless rest. We may not be able to duplicate such a project, but our own understanding of the rhythm of life offered by the Sabbath commandment should encourage the Church to find and support new and creative ways to redeem the time for those who are older, isolated, and alone.

And for those who are over-worked, the church should confess that it has been complicit in the Protestant work ethic that endorses culture’s expectation of endless work to reach success. The church should confess that we have not always spoken on behalf of those who labor long hours for poor wages with no time or resources for genuine rest. Our understanding of the rhythm of life offered by the Sabbath commandment should encourage the Church to gather its energy to ensure that the circadian rhythm of rest and peace and of freedom and hope is available to all.

The bookends of Sabbath as God’s last word and God’s first word apply to our life and death as well. Before he died, the neurologist and author, Oliver Sacks, compared Sabbath rest with his own impending death:
And now, weak, short of breath, my once-firm muscles melted away by cancer, I find my thoughts, increasingly, not on the supernatural or spiritual, but on what is meant by living a good and worthwhile life — achieving a sense of peace within oneself. I find my thoughts drifting to the Sabbath, the day of rest, the seventh day of the week, and perhaps the seventh day of one’s life as well, when one can feel that one’s work is done, and one may, in good conscience, rest.

Knowing that our final Sabbath rest is with God does not take away the sting of death. It does not mean that death is a natural part of life that should be easily embraced. But letting the Sabbath have the last word of peace, when all our work is done, and the first word of hope as we face our own mortality means we know, as Paul writes, that in Christ neither death nor life nor things present nor things to come can separate us from the love of God who created us, redeemed us, and who sustains us throughout our lives.
At the close of each day of our lives and at the close of the last day of our life, we can pray:  
O Lord, support us all the day long
Until the shadows lengthen
And the evening comes,
And the busy world is hushed,
And the fever of life is over,
And our work is done.
Then, in your mercy,
Grant us a safe lodging,
And a holy rest,
And peace at the last.

And we can add “and hope at the beginning,” because we know that our final resting place is not the grave. The only emptiness the Sabbath should ever hold for us is the empty tomb. Heschel’s beautiful words regarding the Sabbath – that it is endowed with a felicity that enraptures the soul – can ring true for us when we move into the rhythm of God’s first and last word, and when we know that Sabbath infuses the peace born of rest and the hope born of resurrection into our weekly lives, into the seasons of our lives, and even into the life to come.